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A Critique of No-Fault Reparation
For Traffic Crash Victims
JOSEPH W. LiTTLE*
No symposium on recent developments in tort law would be com-
plete without a commentary on no-fault reparations, and yet no topic
is less needy of further exposition. Since the Massachusetts No-Fault
Automobile Reparation Act went into effect in January 1971, more
than 100 law journal articles on the broad topic of no-fault reparations
have been published, as have a multitude of books, reports, and news-
paper and popular journal accounts.' Aware of this massive outpouring
of words, I first intended to pick out a narrow issue and produce a
careful analysis that might clarify a small point in the minds of the
legislators and judges who have to wrestle with no-fault systems. My
inclination was to examine the theory and operation of tort exemption
threshqlds in states that have enacted modified no-fault laws.2 In re-
*B.S. 1957, Duke University; M.S. 1961, Worcester Poly. Institute; J.D. 1963,
University of Michigan. Professor of Law, University of Florida, Spessard L. Holland
Law Center.
1 This author has contributed to this sea of words. See Little, Common Law Fault
as a Core Issue in the Automobile Insurance Controversy, 27 TRAsxmc Q. 91 (1970); Little,
How No-Fault Is Working in Florida, 59 A.BA.J. 1020 (1973); Little, No-Fault Auto
Reparation in Florida: An Empirical Examination of Some of Its Effects, 9 J. op LAw
REsop.m 1 (1976).
2At this point I will define this concept and several others that must be distin-
guished. A pure no-fault law is one which completely abrogates tort liability in respect
to a given class of civil wrongs and substitutes payment of some reparations for all
losses in the class. Workmen's compensation laws illustrate this form and apply generally
to the class of injuries suffered by employees on the job. So far, there is no North
American example of the pure no-fault concept in the automobile reparations field.
A modified no-fault law is one that abrogates tort liability in respect to a given class
of civil wrongs except for those that fall into a specially defined subclass. In existing
laws the special subclasses are defined to include injuries of greatest severity. The
criteria that must be met to get into that special subclass are known as tort exemption
thresholds. In addition to the two forms of no-fault that involve tort exemptions there
is another form that has been adopted in some states. This form simply imposes re-
quirements concerning first party no-fault insurance, but without abrogating fault liability
at all. These are known as add-on no-fault laws. If insurance companies must offer this
coverage but motorists are not compelled to buy it, the laws are known as mandatory
add-on laws. If motorists are compelled to buy the insurance, the laws are known as
compulsory add-on laws. Some add-on laws are neither mandatory nor compulsory but
merely authorize the issuance of no-fault coverages. This classification system is adopted
from Keeton, Compensation Systems and Utah's No-Fault Statute, 1973 UTrA L. REv. 383,
385-90.
It is appropriate here also to define certain insurance terms that are used in the
ensuing discussion. Insurance is bought to hedge against risks to which the buyer is
exposed. If a buyer wants to be paid for losses stemming from bodily injury that might
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viewing much of the post-1970 law journal literature, however, I was
struck by the fact that there has been no article that attempts to sum-
marize all aspects of no-fault in terms of its promised goals and in
light of the experience of no-fault states.' Furthermore, I was struck
by the fact that certain aspects of the automobile crash reparations sys-
tem which have never been exposed to excessive discussion may involve
important potentials for cost savings. In view of this I decided that I
befall him or damage that might be incurred by his property, he purchases firat party
insurance and his insurance company becomes obligated to pay him under the terms of
the insurance policy worked out between them. In the automobile insurance field Medica
Payments and Collision coverages are examples that have existed for a long time. Per-
sonal Injury Protection, commonly called PIP, coverage is a new first party coverage
stemming from no-fault laws. If a buyer wants to be indemnified against any legally
enforceable economic liability he may incur to some other person because of harm
that he has caused them, he purchases third party insurance and his insurance company
becomes obligated under contract to defend him against coverage claims and to pay
judgments against him in accordance with the terms of the policy. In the automobile in-
surance field Bodily Injury Liability and Property Damage Liability coverages are
illustrative.
Other coverages of both first and third party modes exist, but only one will be
defined here after this brief explanation of how recoveries are made. If an injured person
wishes to recover under a first party coverage, he simply files a claim with his insurance
company and is paid in accordance with his contract. Disputes between them, if any,
are contractual disputes. By contrast, if an injured person wishes to recover against
the third party insurance company of some tortfeasor who caused harm to the injured
person, the injured person must first establish a tort cause of action against the tortfeasor.
Hence, disputes fall generally into the tort arena. In some cases a tortfeasor is uninsured
and financially irresponsible, making a tort claim valueless. The risk of being injured
by such a person gave rise to a special kind of first party automobile insurance known as
Uninsured Motorists's Coverage (UMC). An injured person collects from his own
insurance company, but only after it has been established that his injuries were caused
by the fault of an uninsured and financially irresponsible tortfeasor.
3 As of January 1976 the roll-call of no-fault states is:
Partial Tort Compulsory Mandatory Add-on
Exemption Add-on Add-on (neither)
Colorado Arkansas Oregon South Dakota
Connecticut Delaware Texas
Florida Maryland Virgina
Georgia South Carolina Wisconsin
Hawaii Kentucky
Kentucky*
Michigan
Minnesota**
Nevada
New Jersey
New York
Pennsylvania
Utah
Puerto Rico
Saskatchewan
*Under the Kentucky law each person elects whether or not to retain tort rights
and liabilities.
**Minnesota was an add-on state until the law was converted to a partial tort
exemption variety by the 1974 Legislature. MumN. STAT. ANN. § 65B (Cune. Supp.
1976).
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would write yet another general article about no-fault but would try to
tie no-fault in theory as closely as I could to no-fault in practice--as
manifested in the no-fault laws and experience under these laws.4
In pursuit of those goals, this paper has been organized into
several sections. First, there is a section on why the no-fault move-
ment came to be. Because this has been discussed in numerous articles,
it is brief. Second will be a section defining a set of reform goals. An
attempt is made to extend the goals beyond those most often stated
by fio-fault proponents and also to discuss openly some of the non-
goals that might accompany reform. Next, a section discussing how
existing no-fault laws relate to the stated reform goals is presented.
This section includes a discussion of the theory of the relationship
between no-fault and these goals and also discusses goal attainmneit
in various no-fault jurisdictions to the extent data are available to
evaluate it. The fourth section systematically reviews the elements
of no-fault as they relate to the attainment of various goals and also
treats, in more depth, the non-goals that might be concomitants of
no-fault and particularly of adjustments to existing no-fault laws.
The final section of the paper is an evaluation (offered with much
trepidation) of the effectiveness of existing no-fault laws in attaining
various reform goals.
WHY NO-FAULT?
One cannot really understand the factors that gave rise to the no-
fault5 laws and the issues involved in no-fault without understanding
4 The state of the literature allows one to find almost any opinion about no-fault
that one seeks. The following quotations are representative of the diverse views that
have been expressed, based mainly upon no-fault theory and not upon experience:
(a) "New Jersey's no-fault plan is a pragmatic reparation's reform law which al-
leviates shortcomings of traditional automobile insurance. While premium costs and
docket congestion are reduced, the primary benefit is prompt compensation of economic
losses." Note, Automobile Reparation Reform: New Jersey's No-Fault Plan, 27 RuTroas L.
REV. 127, 138 (1973).
(b) "[The New York no-fault law] will not provide a more adequate system of
compensation, nor will it reduce court congestion. What it will do is deprive the in-
nocent accident victims of basic rights to compensation . ... If the fault system is im-
perfect, at least it is not unconstitutional" Note, No-Fault Insurance in New York:
Another Hazard for the Innocent Driver, 40 BRooKLYx L. REv. 689, 720 (1974).
(c) "This review of leading cost studies, coupled with some elementary sensitivity
analysis, suggests that no-fault insurance would cost less than automobile insurance under
the present system. Indeed the savings could be substantial but they could also be sub-
tantially less than claimed by no-fault's most enthusiastic supporters." Williams, Will No-
Fault Cost More or Less?, 21 CATm. U.L. REv. 405, 416 (1972).
5Why no-fault? Much has been written on this topic. The best syntheses to be
found are probably R. KEETON & J. O'CoNNm=, BAsIc PROTECTION FOR THE TnArpm
Vicrn: A BLuEPRiNT FOR R oRmIxG AuTomoa= INSURAN cE (1965); REPORT OF
N.Y. INs. CoinzssioN, AuTomoIx. INsuRANcE: FOR WHoSE Bmramm=? (1971); A
1976]
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the relationship between the law of torts and the insurance reparation
system that exists in this country. Over most of the years in which
automobiles and automobile crashes have been a part of our culture,
the resolution of automobile crash reparation issues has been a matter
of private law. Government imposed relatively little statutory law.
Until the no-fault reform movement, only North Carolina, Mas-
sachusetts, and New York had a governmentally imposed requirement
that motorists purchase insurance as a condition to use of the high-
ways, unless the motorist had already been involved in certain desig-
nated kinds of crashes or had been convicted of certain highway of-
fenses.' The role of government was seen merely as one of making
the courts available to resolve the private claims that arose among
users of the highways. The state had nothing to do with whether or not
legitimate claims were collectible, and there was no governmental goal
to provide reparations to crash victims.
Into this void stepped the insurance industry to provide protec-
tion against the risks that were perceived by motorists. These risks
fall generally into two classes. One is the class associated with suf-
fering injury to oneself or damage to one's property, and the second
is the class or risks associated with liability for harm done to the per-
son or property of someone else. Interestingly enough, motorists have
traditionally been more concerned about economic risks than they have
been about risks of injury to themselves or their property. The fact
that a greater proportion of motorists traditionally have purchased
liability insurance than have purchased first party insurance adds
credence to this view.7 Furthermore, the amount of risk covered in
liability insurance policies is typically more than the amount of risk
Study of Hawaii's Motor Vehicle Insurance Program, Special Report No. 72-1, A Re-
port to the Legislature of the State of Hawaii (January 1972). The best single compila-
tion of analyses of factors underlying the discontent is probably WALTR E. MYms
RESEARCHi INSTITUTE oF LAW, DOLLARS, DELAY AND TuE AUTOMOBILE VICTM: STUDIES IN
REPARATION FOR HIGHWAY INJURIES AND RELATED COURT PROBLEMS (1968). Also of much
value in this regard is a series of reports issued by the U.S. Department of Transportation,
especially I DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE AND COMPENSATION STUDY,
ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT INJUIES (April 1970).
6The import of financial security laws is to require motorists to obtain insurance or
other security only after having had an injury-producing crash or non-crash violations
such as driving while intoxicated. Florida's financial responsibility law is illustrative. See
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 324 (1975). See generally C. BRAINARD, AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE 415-48
(1961).
7 The insurance buying practices of Florida motorists is illustrative. In a sample of
over 4,000 policies in force in 1971, the last pre-no-fault year in Florida, 16.2 percent of
the policy holders who purchased liability coverage chose not to buy first party coverages.
This statistic is derived from data in the possession of the author obtained in an impact
study of the Florida no-fault law sponsored by the Council on Law-Related Studies of
Cambridge, Massachusetts, and the University of Florida College of Law.
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covered in first party insurance policies.' In sum, the automobile
crash victim reparation system in this country has come to be a synthesis
of the law of torts, based strongly upon the fault concept and the lia-
bility insurance system. For convenience this system will be referred to
as the tort law-liability insurance system.
To reformists, the principal shortcoming of the system was that
too many people were left uncompensated after suffering injury on
the highway. The requirement of fault as a condition of recovery
and the concomitant doctrine of contributory negligence left a large
proportion of injured persons without any entitlement of recovery
under traditional tort law. Because first party insurance coverages
were far from universal, and even when they existed they usually paid
up to relatively small limits, the result was a system that left a great
many victims uncompensated.
The same factors that yield uncompensated victims also yield
under-compensated victims. However, other factors compound the under-
compensation picture, especially in instances of severe injury. It has
already been observed that first party insurance coverages have rela-
tively low limits. Severely injured victims often suffer tangible losses
much greater than these limits. Moreover, even if there is a third party
at fault, against whom a liability claim may be made, quite often the
amount of liability coverage that such a third party may have pur-
chased will be exceeded by the extent of injuries suffered. This means
that even though there was liability insurance in the picture, the victim
will still remain under-compensated because of the limits of liability
under the insurance contract, unless the tortfeasor himself was of
sufficient financial stature to pay a judgment out of his own resources.
As a result, I believe it to be true that the injured party's claim would
most often be settled within the limits of coverage of the tortfeasor's
liability insurance policy.
A third major criticism of the tort law-liability insurance repara-
tion system is that many crash victims were over-compensated. Two
factors are at work here. One derives from the fact that our law of
torts recognizes damages based on intangible aspects of the personal
injury suffered by an injured victim. These intangible elements com-
8 Liability insurance is purchased up to limits agreed to by the contracting parties.
Typically, limits will be set for bodily injury liability to an individual; aggregate bodily
injury liability in a single crash; and property damage liability per crash. To illustrate, a
15/30/5 automobile liability policy would insure the motorist for risks up to $15,000 per
individual; $30,000 for all persons in the crash; and $5,000 aggregated property damage.
Liability above those limits would be uninsured. First party insurance also is issued up
to limits, typically $5,000 per person per crash.
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monly are denominated as pain, suffering, and inconvenience, and are
intended to compensate for losses that do not manifest themselves
directly in economic terms as do medical expenses and lost wages. The
mere existence of this element of recovery gives potential value above
tangible losses to virtually every personal injury claim, especially those
in which bodily injury has been clearly manifested. When this factor is
joined with the fact that it costs a liability insurance company a sub-
stantial amount of money to investigate elements of fault and of dam-
ages in claims, it is understandable that in a certain class of small
claims it is more economical from the liability insurance companies'
standpoint to pay the claim than it is to defend it. Accordingly, in
a large class of cases in which either liability or the extent of dam-
ages was in some doubt, it became the practice of liability insurance
companies to pay the "nuisance" value of the claims rather than to
litigate them, suffer all of the costs associated with the litigation, and
still stand the risk of losing in court. Typically, the nuisance value of
a small claim would be somewhere in the range of three to five times
provable medical expenses. While not always true, this system gen-
erally had the effect of awarding more money than was justified to a
great many victims who had suffered only minor injuries and in some
cases to victims who had suffered no injury at all. Because the great
preponderance of automobile crash victims suffer only minor injuries,
the economic impact of this practice was large.9
A second factor that contributed to the over-compensation of
some victims was the availability of collateral sources of recovery
and the so-called "collateral source rule" that prevails in the tort law
of most jurisdictions. In many instances, an injured victim would
be entitled to payment for medical losses under a health or accident
policy or under workman's compensation or similar employment re-
lated programs, and commonly he would be entitled to continuation
of wages from the same or similar sources. Under the collateral source
rule. the existence of these sources of recovery did not require the
diminution of the tort recovery. That the victim had been prudent
9 That the bulk of personal injury claims falls into a range of values less than $1,000
is shown by the following statistics derived from a Florida study of insurance claims.
Settlement Amounts Percentage of All Claims
1971 1972 1973
$0 to $500 64.8 63.7 70.2
$501 to $999 10.4 9.7 9.0
$1,000 to $2,000 14.8 10.0 5.1
$2,000 and above 10.0 16.6 15.6
(298 claims) (330 claims) (332 dlm)
Source: Little, No-Fault Auto Reparation in Florida: An Empirical Examination of Some
of Its Effects, 9 J. or LAw REFoR 1, Table 14 (1976).
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enough to provide protection for himself, it was argued, should not be
of advantage to the tortfeasor. Furthermore, because recovery from
the collateral sources was guaranteed by contracts between the victim
and his employer or his first party insurance carrier, the fact that
recovery was unavailable under the tort law did not affect the right
to receive the first party benefits. As a consequence, the collateral
source rule tended to enhance the over-compensation in instances of
minor injuries among the class of victims which was entitled to protec-
tion from the collateral sources. It is also true, of course, that the
collateral source rule helped alleviate the effects of under-compensation
in some instances.
Delay of the settlement process because of congestion in the courts
was another causative factor in the no-fault reform movement. No-
fault reformists were able to document the fact that crowded court
dockets in some jurisdictions sometimes caused delays of several years
in settling law suits.Y Extensive delay in settlement of liability claims
means not only that the claimant must wait to receive his money, but
also that in many instances he may get less money than he is entitled to.
This is most likely to occur in instances of very severe injury in which
a claimant has been rendered impecunious and is coerced by his cir-
cumstances to settle his case for less than the verdict that might be
rendered by a jury. Hence, court congestion is bad not only because
delay in justice is bad but also because it exacerbates the maldistribu-
tion of benefits already existing under the tort law-liability insurance
system.
The escalating cost of insurance was perhaps the factor that most
significantly assisted the no-fault reformists. While to many re-
formists, the problems of under-compensation and no compensation
may have been more important, it was the cost factor that caught the
interest of the public and enabled the reformists to overcome institu-
tional resistance to change. 1 The blame for increasing costs was
usually laid on the so-called nuisance value of the minor personal in-
jury claim under liability policies, and also to the lawyers' fees that
were paid by claimants. No-fault was offered as a way of reducing
these elements of cost and many people supported the change on that
basis. As will be shown in later discussion, however, other cost factors
have not yet been touched by the existing no-fault laws and some aspects
10 Data on delay in courts are assembled in Rosenberg, Court Congestion: Status,
Causes, and Proposed Remedies, in DoLLARs, DELAY AD THE Accmsr' Vxcnm at 151,
supra note 5.
11 See, e.g., the backdrop that led to passage of the Massachusetts law as described in
Coombs, The Massachusetts Experience Under No-Fault, 44 Miss. LJ. 158 (1973).
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of these laws are counterproductive in the sense that they actually add
additional costs.
While there may have been other factors that contributed to the
reform movement, these were the most instrumental.
WHAT ARE REASONABLE REFORM GOALS?
Having sifted through the great volume of writing criticizing the
underlying tort law-liability insurance reparation system, I would pro-
pose reform goals in five areas: (1) redefinition of reparations; (2)
cost reduction goals; (3) cost reallocation goals; (4) reallocation of
societal resource goals; and (5) elimination of corruption in the
reparation system goals. Each of these points will be developed in a
general way here and the theory and practice of how no-fault might
lead to its attainment will be discussed in the next section of the paper.
Table I isolates individual goals and indicates generally how they
have been influenced by existing no-fault laws and what some of the
unintended externalities have been.
Reparation Goals
Two general reparation goals may be stated. The first is simple
and straightforward-to provide essential medical care and life sup-
port for all victims of automobile crashes. Professor Alfred Conard's
statement that:
Wounds should be healed, bones set, prostheses supplied, psychic re-
adjustment achieved, and occupational retraining provided when
needed.., for every victim, regardless of whether or not the victim was
himself careless, whether or not the guilty driver can be found, and
whether or not he can pay or has purchased adequate insurance. Medi-
cal services should be supplied for humanitarian reasons-because the
modem conscience demands that no one unnecessarily be left phy-
sically impaired. They should also be supplied for economic reasons-
because every one loses when a member of society ceases to contribute
to the national product and becomes instead a burden on the shoulders
of others . 2. 1
A second reparation goal would be to seek more equitable distribu-
tive justice in the allocation of benefits paid to crash victims. One
sub-goal would be to eliminate over-payment to victims of minor
12Conard, The Econonic Treatnent of Automobile Injuries, in DoLLARS, DF.AY AND
m AccmT VicTni at 431, supra note 5.
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injuries, where that over-payment represents nothing but the nuisance
value of the claim. The second sub-goal would be to eliminate under-
payment of the victims of severe injury, and a third sub-goal would be
to make payments available sooner to all recipients.
It should be noted here that some goals will be inconsistent with
other goals. For example, the goal of universal reparations for all
victims and the goal for eliminating under-payment of victims of
severe injuries are inconsistent with the next general goal of reducing
cost.
Cost Reduction Goal
When reformists have spoken of cost reduction, they have been
referring to the cost paid by consumers for insurance contracts. As
already observed, the focus of cost reduction analyses has been the
nuisance value of minor personal injury cases and payments made
to lawyers by injured claimants against tortfeasors and their liability
insurers. While these aspects of cost must be accounted for, to con-
centrate solely upon them is to fail to obtain a complete picture of
the cost structure of insurance.13
One may look to the basic accounting structure and experience
of the insurance industry to obtain a fuller picture. For example, if
one looks at the aggregated experience of mutual and stock automobile
liability insurance companies for years 1964-73, one will find aP-
proximately the following disposition of each premium dollar paid by
consumers.14 (1) Paid out in benefits: $.62. (This includes both the
amount that finally gets into the hands of beneficiaries and the amount
beneficiaries pay to lawyers and others in obtaining the benefits.) (2)
Spent by insurance company in investigating and paying claims: $.12.
(3) Commissions paid to agents and brokers: $.11. (4) Other under-
writing expenses: $.14. (5) Underwriting profits: Nil or slightly
18 Discussion of insurance company accounting practices and how they allocate costs
is to be found in Spangenberg, No-Fault Fact, Fiction, and Fallacy, 44 Miss. L.J. 15 (1973),
and A Study of Hawaii's Motor Vehile Insurance Program, Special Report No. 72-1, A Re-
port to the Legislature of the State of Hawaii (January 1972). See also Williams, Will No-
Fault Cost More or Less?, 21 CATrE. U.L. Rv. 405 (1972).
14To support this set of estimates aggregate insurance experience data for the years
1964-73 have been extracted from AM. BEST, AGGGTEs & AvERAGEs (1974) and re-
produced here.
From the same publication is obtained the following information breaking down the
ratio "Losses Adjusting Expenses incurred to Premium Earned" for the year 1974 into
components as follows:
Stock Companies: 64.0 percent losses; 11.2 percent Adjusting Expenses
(Bodily injury liability).
Mutual Companies: 60.8 percent losses; 13.4 percent Adjusting Expenses
(Bodily injury liability).
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INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 51:635
oo
boO
0
0
'.4 0
(~ 0- '0'0t400
0 0
00C~OV'~
0- '0~00'0'0,-1..-4~
I I*sImIIi1
'd4- 0n0 '0-000', 0 ,-4 "9 0
'010'10'10'0'%00 0- 0- 0
0' 0 0' 0'. 0' ' 0' 0' C' 0I-I 1-4 H- 1-4 F--4 -1 H- H- 1
03
~
m0 1,46% 00 0
'41 00%CWX- W00,0 0kW 0.-400090000 0h 0 m 01 -( m ") C0' 0'001 (9n 000
't 0 i - w1 0mI* n0 ,e 0wIt4C 00 0 1
00'0000r00f r01 0 C0-0-0 w (%o -0'"'0 0 0'D w '%0tIn0I
cq 00 -'0 '00 O O'000I00000(90'0'0'1q.-4X*. q.ctIl ii riI I
w in 14 0 ww0 0 % n- m (14-01
(9 101-
06 oz 0'* 0'* 0': (S 00* 00 Z,
c9'! .O- eq 0 1i -4 0
m- .---0 0 "- "- m eq
-4 0 0 0 4 0 (-4 0'i 00 '0
on (90 t.vA4 A0 '00 A 4'
40 00 Z,' 00 m '0o %4
00- 0 0000'00' 01
~~~~~~~ 00' 0mI 0'
r400 OF' 0F H '0, w00 S
~0 '00- m 00 , 01
00 0000 (90' 00 '00 -F
mmX 0 0 0
'n. 01 "- -4-47(99(
m 0 C li0- %
'0 1 .99( (.. .- (99(
,-4 A 4 A 4 - -, -A .. A '
0O 000-X- C; 0-0r40-t04 1-
00-0 - 00 V.-- X--
0,0
0-: 0i -4 -0- 0 00, 0 0
0i 0q. C . 0~t cq 0' 0 0
00-
n- In 10 0 0' 00 00' 0i
W0- 0' " 00 ' 0' ( 0
,q . 0.A-00w 0~4(0
o, a, 0' o' 0' 0 0 '0'0
04 44
zi*
n0g(90000-00 o 4.1- 0~ 8 .- 909-( Ooo' 00,1,(91 g00 "' 0 0'Q 00
,0 -d- 0 n " H q 00 'a' "00 '0 40-0 .
m %o 00 0 1- 9 wr M40'S 0'(9It0CLIli-0q, t IM,
:F 00 -1M0a-400 t-C 000 If- 4g C
o000( coMV 0'0 %'00'. '0-0 C4 ' 4t -0 0
11- 00t1, n or -u
, U
cn
0
1976] NO-FAULT'REPARATION 645
negative. 1  By comparison, the distribution of the premium dollar
paid in for automobile physical damage insurance is about as follows:
$.60 to beneficiaries; $.08 to investigation and adjustment cost; $.12
to commissions; $.14 to other underwriting expenses; and, $.05 to
profit.16
15Most of the profit made by automobile liability insurance companies comes from
the investment value of premiums between the time they are paid in by policy holders
and paid out by insurers. Spangenberg explains this system. See Spangenberg, supra note
13. Hence, while underwriting profits may be small or nonexistent, investment profits are
generally substantial. This, of course, allows the insurance industry to stay in business.
16From the same source from which the Bodily Injury Liability data of footnote 14
were extracted were obtained the following Automobile Physical Damage Data:
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Looking to this more complete analysis of the cost of insurance,
one can suggest that cost paring need not be limited to pain and suf-
fering benefits and claimants' legal fees. Settlement costs incurred by
the insurance industry in processing claims, and marketing and other
underwriting costs of providing insurance are other potential targets.
Ideally, a third area might be to reduce profits, if profits were un-
reasonable, but if one is to examine only underwriting profits, one
would conclude that not much gain is to be made.
Equitable Cost Assessment Goals
The raison d'etr'e of insurance is to spread the cost of designated
risks among a large population of persons so that the individuals
"selected" to suffer the damage being guarded against will not have
to bear the brunt of the full economic cost. Consequently, it is simply
a contradiction in terms to suggest that the full costs of the insurance
be allocated to the individual upon whom harm actually falls. Never-
theless, it is true that certain people are exposed to greater risk from
a given danger than are others, and this being so, it is arguably cor-
rect that the class of persons exposed to the greatest risk should pay
more than members of classes exposed to less risk. Traditionally, these
considerations have been part of the pricing mechanisms used by in-
surance companies in allocating the costs of insurance among their
policy holders. Nevertheless, existing insurance price structures have
been criticized on the basis that they do not define risk categories
on a fair basis.' For example, drivers under age 25 have uniformly
been cast into high risk-high price categories without considera-
tion of the driving proclivities of the individuals. Interestingly enough,
various no-fault measures, while perhaps meeting some goals, may in
fact create their own inequities in price.1
8
Another facet of cost allocation is the fact that when heavy trucks
crash with passenger vehicles the risk of personal injuries being suf-
fered is much greater among occupants of the passenger vehicles than
among occupants of the trucks. Under the pricing of liability insur-
ance, this risk differential shows up in higher costs of insurance paid
by truckers to account for the greater economic risk to which they are
The breakdown of losses and adjusting expenses in 1974 was as follows:
Stock Companies: 61.2 percent losses; 7.8 percent expenses.
Mutual Companies: 59.8 percent losses; 9.1 percent expenses.
'
TSee, e.g., A Study of Hawaii's Motor Vehicle Insurance Program 49-61 Special Re-
port No. 72-1, A Report to the Legislature of Hawaii (January 1972).
sS&e, e.g., Blum & Kalven, Ceilings, Costs, and Compulsion In Auto Compensation
Legislation, 1973 UTAH L. Ryv. 341, 362-64.
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exposed when a crash occurs. If the liability system were to be com-
pletely supplanted by a first party system in which each motorist was
responsible for the injuries suffered in his own vehicle, then the price
of truck insurance would go down, representing decreased risk, and
the price of automobile insurance would go up, representing the other
side of the coin. It is this difficult problem of cost assessment that has
in part led some jurisdictions to exclude commercial vehicles from the
coverage of their no-fault laws."9
Reallocation of Societal Resources Goals
Reduction of court congestion has already been enunciated as a
means of aiding the goal of distributive justice in payment of benefits.
In addition, taking cases out of court that ought not be there to begin
with frees the courts and their attendant mechanisms for utilization
in the resolution of more worthy issues. I hasten to add that the
resolution of private disputes about liability matters is not thought
of as unworthy per se. But elimination of cases that come into the courts
only because deficiencies in legal processes give litigation value to cases
that would be denied actual value by prompt application of substantive
law, is a worthy goal.
Furthermore, time and resources spent by lawyers and doctors
and various people that support their activities in preparing for and
litigating many claims could better be utilized in other areas. To the
extent that the nuisance value theory of minor personal injury claims
causes the use of more medical resources than the injuries actually re-
quire, the system clearly causes waste of precious resources that need
to be reallocated for more deserving purposes.
The Goal of Ending Corruption in the System
Implicit in the nuisance value theory that leads to the magnifica-
tion of the value of certain minor injury claims is the notion that the
legal and medical professions and the insurance industry are willing
accessories to claims practices that border on fraud. Clearly, profes-
sional responsibility requires that lawyers and doctors give the bene-
fit of the doubt to their clients and patients. Nevertheless, to the extent
that the system is being overtly corrupted by members of the profes-
sions themselves, a reform goal should be to find measures to end such
corruption.
19 For example, the Florida law does not bring commercial vehicles under the no-
fault requirements, presumably at least in part on this account. The exclusion is ac-
complished by restrictively defining covered motor vehicles. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.732(1)
(1973).
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Non-Goals
In setting reform goals, one should also anticipate externalities
that one does not seek to obtain. These I call non-goals. One non-goal
often associated with the no-fault reform movement is to under-
mine societal values of individual responsibility. Some people believe
that the concept of fault is crucial to accepted notions of individual
responsibility and that eliminating fault from any part of the tort
law would be a dangerous move.20 Other non-goals that one might
enunciate would be to put lawyers out of business, to put insurance
companies out of business, and to create a system more susceptible
to abuse of professionalism and to fraud than is the existing system.
Do EXISTING "NO-FAULT SYSTEMS" ADDRESS THESE GOALS?
In Theory
The term "no-fault systems" is used to describe the sets of measures
that have been proposed and enacted to cure the ills of the tort law-
liability insurance reparations system. This acknowledges that the
no-fault concept is only one of a battery of measures that will be needed.
Table I lists the set of reform goals proposed earlier and correlates
them with specific measures that might be a part of a comprehensive
no-fault reform system. The lineup of reform measures is comprised
of: (1) mandatory first party insurance that pays tangible economic,
20A U.S. Department of Transportation sponsored review of literature concluded that
efforts to correct human driving errors were largely ineffective. DEr'T op TRANSPORTATIO
AurroMoBrrE COmPNSATiON STmY, CAusAIox, CuLPABIxIY AND DEmERRENCE n Hm-
WAY CRASEs (1970). This minimizes the influence of the fault principle in behavior con-
trol and has been strongly criticized. See, e.g., Mancuso, The Utility of the Culpability
Concept in Promoting Proper Driving Behavior, 55 MARQUE=TE L. REv. 85 (1972); Law-
ton, Commentary: No-Fault: An Invitation to More Accidents, 55 MARQUET L. Rzv. 73
(1972); Ring, The Fault with 'No-Fault,' 49 NoRE DA.mE LAw. 796 (1974): "Much of
the confusion connected with no-fault stems from the 'no-fault' label. 'Fault' is and always
will be present. It is only responsibility for fault that would be abolished by the insur-
ance industry's proposals. This is the fault with no-fault." Id. at 825.
Another critic has said:
It is the purpose of the tort system to differentiate between right and wrong,
between good driving and bad, and impose liability upon the wrongdoer for the
whole loss he inflicts. Tort liability insurance is intended to help the wrongdoer
pay his obligation, including the obligation to compensate for disability, suffering,
and loss of enjoyment of life. The simple reason why the tort system does not
compensate all victims is that many victims are totally wrong and have no just
claim on other drivers for compensation.
Spangenberg, No-Fault Fact, Fiction, and Fallacy, 44 Miss. L.J. 15, 52 (1973).
Thoughtful defenses of the fault principle may also be found in Tunc, Fault: A
Common Name For Different Misdeeds, 49 TuLAN L. RFv. 279 (1975) and Green, No-
Fault: A Perspective, 1975 B.Y.U.L. REv. 79, and an historical and contemporary over-
view of the attitudes of courts toward fault is to be found in Jorgensen, Liability and
Fault, 49 TuLmE L. Rrv. 329 (1975).
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medical, rehabilitation, and income losses without regard to fault; (2)
abrogation of tort liability for economic losses to the extent they are
paid by the no-fault plan; (3) abrogation of tort liability for pain
and suffering; (4) abrogation or modification of the collateral source
rule; (5) enhancement of bulk insurance marketing plans or pre-
emption of no-fault insurance to a state agency to be sold in conjunction
with driver and vehicle licensing systems; and (6) revision of insurance
pricing schedules to conform to rational risk allocation policies. Each
of these measures is aligned with one or more reform goals in Table
I and each is followed by a brief commentary.
Fashioning a workable reform package from this catalogue of
corrective measures is not easy. Some measures work toward certain
goals and against others. Furthermore, the extent of need for reform
may vary greatly from place to place. Later discussion shows, for ex-
ample, that court congestion proved to be markedly different in Mas-
sachusetts than in Delaware. Furthermore, the feasibility of each re-
form measure varies greatly in relation to local attitudes and pressures.
That the interworking of these factors has produced an assortment
of reform packages in states that have taken action already has been
observed."' These plans all include a first party no-fault insurance
element22 and some of them include a partial abrogation of tort lia-
bility. None has yet gone the full route of complete abrogation and
apparently only one state23 has created a no-fault plan without limita-
tion on the amount of mandated benefits. This means that present no-
fault laws either simply add on a first party element with little24 or no
change in the underlying tort law-liability insurance system, or im-
pose no-fault recoveries on a tort system that has been truncated by
2 1See notes 2-3 supra & text accompanying. It might be observed that some people
believe this variability is a bad thing and ought to be corrected by federal legislation.
See, e.g., Hart, National No-Fault Insurance: The People Need It Now, 21 CATH. U.L.
REv. 259 (1972); Magnuson, Nationwide No-Fault, 44 Mss. L. REv. 132 (1973). Most
of the national no-fault proposals have centered around the proposed Uniform Motor
Vehicle Accident Reparations Act. An exposition is made in Henderson, The Uniform
Motor Vehicle Accident Reparations Act, 44 Mass. L. Rav. 107 (1973).
22 But not all laws mandate such coverage. See note 2 supra.
23Michigan has no stated limit on medical and rehabilitation payments, MCH. CoMp.
LAws ANN. § 500.3107(a) (1975), and work loss benefits extend over three years, Macu.
ComP. LAws Amr. § 500.3107(b) (1975). All other states apparently have some limit, with a
high of $50,000 in New York, N.Y. INs. LAw, ch. 13, art. 18, § 671(1) (McKinney 1975),
ranging downward to the lower levels seen in the states in this study.
24 The Delaware law does not abrogate tort liability, but does preclude no-fault bene-
fits from being pleaded and proved in court. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 2118(g) (Rev.
1974). Notwithstanding this preclusion, however, Delaware lawyers are said still to be
"cheerfully" pleading such damages. Clark & Waterson, 'No-Fault' In Delaware, 6
RUTGERS-CAmDEN L.J. 225, 230 (1974). The purported goal of the Delaware plan is to
eliminate the multiplier nuisance value effect in small cases. Id. at 230.
[Vol. 51:635
NO-FA ULT REPARATION
exemptions that abrogate tort liability except for designated classes
of severe injuries.
While it probably would not be worthwhile to dissect and classify
all the existing no-fault laws, it may be helpful to examine important
features of a few. Massachusetts, Florida, and Delaware were front-
runners in the reform movement and their systems have operated long
enough to produce quantifiable results. For that reason the laws of
these three states have been selected for scrutiny.
The laws of both Massachusetts and Florida are of the modified
tort abrogation variety and are similar enough to make it unnecessary
to present both except for the fact that somewhat different consequences
have arisen in the two locales. The Delaware law is of the add-on variety.
Central aspects of the no-fault systems of Massachusetts, Florida, and
Delaware are set out in Tables II through IV. With no intention of
presenting the basic information twice, a few comments will be made
in this narrative in order to place the detailed information into perspec-
tive. Massachusetts, Florida, and Delaware all mandate that- no-fault
benefits be made available for medical and wage losses, but only up to
a limit of $2,000 in Massachusetts, $5,000 in Florida, and $10,000 in
Delaware (Table II). Presumably, these limits serve to hold down costs
as do universally authorized deductibles (Table II), partial tort ex-
emptions in Massachusetts and Florida, and a prohibition on pleading
and proving certain losses in Delaware (Table IV). Other cost-reduction
factors are noted in Table V. Massachusetts and Florida employ the
tort exemption to the extent of abrogating liability for pain and
suffering, unless specified thresholds are exceeded, but Delaware does
not (Table IV). All the states exclude certain persons from cov-
erage, but this seems to be more an attempt to disqualify wrong-
doers than to save money (Table III). All three plans make benefits
available to occupants of vehicles and pedestrians struck by vehicles
(Table III), but Florida is more restrictive in that commercial vehicles
and motorcycles are not covered (Table III). While presumably this
was the result of lobbying, it could be recognition of the difficulty of
allocating costs fairly through first party insurance when a mixture of
vehicle types is covered. In both Massachusetts and Florida the no-fault
benefits protect the insured and other named persons even when they
are occupants of a vehicle other than that owned by the insured person.
In sum, one can see some realization of a limited general reparation
goal; somewhat limited attempts at enhancing distributive justice; pos-
sible important inroads on nuisance value recoveries in Massachusetts
and Florida, but less so in Delaware; only minor efforts to reduce col-
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lateral source duplications; possible important reductions in settlement
costs and court congestion in Massachusetts and Florida, but less so in
Delaware; but no recognized addressing of cost reallocation goals. These
factors are compiled in Table VI with a comparison of the theoretical
and practical results observed in the three states.
Although the decision to eschew detailed examination of all no-fault
laws will be adhered to, the great variability among approaches taken
to treat the "nuisance value" and other cost-related criticisms of tort
law-liability insurance systems is so remarkable as to deserve further
comment. It has been observed that some states have adopted a modified
tort exemption scheme and others have not. Several of the add-on states
simply pile no-fault benefits on top of existing systems and took no
cost-saving measures. 25 Three add-on states tried novel approaches to
reduce nuisance value or duplicative recoveries. Oregon 8 and South
Carolina27 did it by setting off from the dollar value of tort recoveries
the dollar value of no-fault benefits paid. Presumably, litigating practices
are not affected in the slightest, but the overlap of no-fault benefits and
tort recoveries is eliminated. Oregon28 and South Carolina29 also preclude
duplication of no-fault and workmen's compensation benefits. While
overlap is cut back, it is hard to see how any existing nuisance value
problem would be relieved.
A s has been observed, Delaware's no-fault law addresses nuisance
value by prohibiting the pleading and proving of -payable no-fault bene-
fits." Delaware also prevents overlapping of no-fault and workmen's
compensation benefits.31 Thus, it would appear that the Delaware law
goes further than Oregon and South Carolina in treating underlying
25 Among these are Maryland, MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 533 (Supp. 1975); South
Dakota, S.D. LAws § 58-23-6, 7, 8 (Supp. 1975); Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 204.30
(1975); and Texas, TEx. I- s. CODE art. 5.06-3 (1975).
26 ORE. REV. STAT. § 743.835 (1974).27 South Carolina Insurance Reform Act, S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-750.115 (Cum. Supp.
1975). It has been noted that the 'fact that -the law requires the set off of benefits paid
rather than payable may create bad results. The South Carolina Insurance Reform Act (Part
I): 'No Fault' and Contributory Negligence-A Synopsis and Appraisal, 26 S.C. LAw REv.
705, 721 -(1975).2 80mx Ray. STAT. § 743.810(1) (1974) reduces no-fault benefits if the injured per-
son is entitled to receive workmen's compensatory "or any similar medical or disability
benefits."2 9 South Carolina Insurance Reform Act, S.C. CODE ANN. §46-750.115(d) (Cum.
Supp. 1975), reduces the no-fault benefits to the extent that workmen's action benefits
have been received.
3 0 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 2118(g) (Rev. 1974). The Delaware law avoids the
uncertainty created in the South Carolina law, see note 27 supra, by precluding the plead-
ing and proving of benefits available.
3' DEL. CoDE ANN. tit 21, § 2118(f) (Rev. 1974) subrogates the victim's workmens
compensation rights to the no-fault carrier. Compare the South Carolina approach, note
29 supra.
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ills and presumably is better devised to reduce costs of liability insur-
ance. It should be observed, however, that the Delaware plan calls for
$10,0002 in no-fault benefits; whereas, the Oregon and South Carolina
plans call for only $3,000 3 and $1,0003' respectively.
Among the tort exemption states the variety of plans is bewildering
in detail. The -tort exemption typically is stated in two parts. First, tort
liability for economic losses is abrogated up to the amount of recover-
able mandated no-fault benefits. 5 Hence, if the no-fault plan provides
$1,000 in medical benefits and a $5,000 medical loss occurs, only $4,000
would be recoverable in tort. Second, liability for pain and suffering
is abrogated unless a threshold is exceeded. All current partial tort ex-
emption laws have thresholds defined by injury classifications that typi-
cally include death, permanent injury and permanent disfigurement, 86
and most have an alternative medical expense threshold.37 Satisfying
8aDx. CODE ANN. tit. 21, J 2118(a)(2) (Rev. 1974).
83 ORE. REV. STAT. § 743.800(1) (1974). Oregon also provides additional wage loss
benefits. ORE. REv. STAT. § 743.800(2) (1974).
4 S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-750.111 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
5 At least the following states have this feature: Colorado, CoLo. REV. STAT. § 10-4-713
(1973); Connecticut, 17A COEN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §38-323(a) (1973); Florida, FR.P
STAT. ANN. § 627.737(1) (1972); Georgia, GA. CoDE § 56-34106(b) (1974) (the Georgia
law precludes the pleading or recovering of no-fault benefits in an action against a tort-
fasor); Hawaii, HAwAxr REv. STAT. §§ 294-1 et seq. (Cum. Supp. 1975); Kentucky, KY.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 304.39-060(2) (a) (Supp. 1976); Massachusetts, MATss. GEE. LAws ANN.
ch. 90, §34m (1970); Michigan, MVhcH. Coin'. LAws §500.3135(2)(c) (1973) (work excess
loss only; no-fault pays all medical); Minnesota, Mnn. STAT. ANN. § 65B.5I(g) (Supp.
1975). Nevada, NEv. Ray. STAT. § 698.280(1) (h) (1973); New York, N.Y. INs. LAw
§ 673(1) (1974); Pennsylvania, PA. STAT. ANN. tit 40, § 301(a) (4) (1974); Puerto Rico, 2A
P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 9, § 2058(1) (Cum. Supp. 1974).
36 In addition to the states listed in note 35 supra, the following statutes also have
this sort of pain and suffering threshold: CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38-323 (a) (Supp. 1976) ;
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-3117 (1974); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6A-8 (1973); and UTX_ CODE
ANN. § 31-41-9 (1973). Most states copy some or all of the criteria initially enacted in the
Massachusetts law. Some also include a threshold based upon a specified duration of
disability. See, e.g., Colorado, 52 weeks, CoLo. Rnv. STAT. ANN. § 10-4-714(1) (f) (1974);
Georgia, disability of ten consecutive days. GA. CoDE § 56-34026(j) (1974); Minnesota,
disability for 60 days or more, Mhm. STAT. ANNi. § 65B.51(3) (a) (4) (1975); and Pennsyl-
vania, '60 consecutive days, PA. STAT. AiN. tit. 40, 1301(a)(5)(c) (1974) have this
feature.3 7 The medical expense threshold on pain and suffering recovery varies from state
to state: Connecticut, $400 (CoNe. GEE. STAT. ANN. §38-323(a)(7) (1973)); Colorado,
500 (Cowo. REa. STAT. ANN. §10-4-714(1) (e) (1973)); Florida, $1,000 (FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 627.737(2) (1972); Georgia, $500 (GA. CoDE § 56-3402(b)(j), 3410(b)(a) (1974));
Hawaii, an adjustable figure set at $1,500 through Aug. 31, 1976 (HAwAm Rav. STAT.
§294-6(a)(2) (1974)); Kansas, $500 (KAN. STAT. ANN. §40-3117 (1974)) Kentucky,
$1,000 (Ky. R v. STAT. ANN. § 304.39-060(2) (b) (Supp. 1976)); Massachusetts, $500 (MAss.
AaN. LAws ch. 231, § 6D (1970)); Michigan, none, tort exemption is not waived on this
basis; Minnesota, $2,000 (MfiEN. STAT. ANN. §65B.51(3)(a) (1975)); Nevada, $750
(Nav. Ray. ST.AT. §698.280(1)(h) (1975)); New Jersey, $200 expended on injury to
"soft tissue of the body" (N.J. STAT. ANN. §39:6A-8 (1973)); New York, $500 (N.Y.
INs. LAw § 671(4) (b) (1974)); Pennsylvania, $750 excluding certain X-ray and rehabilita-
tion costs in excess of $100 (PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1009.301(a) (5) (B) (1975)); Puerto
Rico, $2,000 (2A P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 9, § 2058(b) (Cum. Supp. 1974)).
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either the injury classification or the medical expense threshold elimi-
nates the tort exemption as to pain and suffering damages but, except
in Connecticut 8 and Florida,8" does not eliminate the exemption on re-
covery of economic losses.
Kansas and Utah follow a slightly different scheme in that the tort
exemptions apply only to non-economic detriment (pain and suffering)
and not to economic losses. Overlapping of tort and no-fault recoveries
for economic losses is avoided in Kansas by giving the no-fault insurer
the right to reimbursement from tort judgments and settlements. 40
While the statutory scheme is not clear, Utah apparently avoids over-
lap by subrogating the no-fault insurer to a portion of the victim's claims
through an arbitration process.41
The New Jersey plan is novel in that its tort exemption applies
only to injury "confined solely to the soft tissue of the body."4 Hence,
the $200 medical expense and injury classification thresholds 3 pertain
only to soft tissue injuries, because no tort exemption exists as to
others.4 4 The Puerto Rico law is peculiar in that the tort exemption not
only is removed when economic losses exceed $2,000 but also when the
loss exceeds $1,000 "for physical and mental suffering, including pain,
humiliation and similar damages."45 The Puerto Rico system may prove
to be fraught with difficulties in distinguishing between legitimate and
illegitimate claims. The Kentucky plan also embodies a unique feature.
Under that state's law any person may "refuse to consent to the limita-
38 The Connecticut law has a single set of thresholds that applies to both "economic
loss and non-economic detriment." Conn. Gu.N. STAT. RFV. §38-323(a) (1973). Overlap
is avoided by "reimbursement from the claimant to the extent that (no-fault) benefits
have been paid." CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38-325(b) (1973).
8 9 Once a pain and suffering threshold is cleared in Florida, the injured victim may
sue in tort for general damages and all economic losses including those paid by no-fault
benefits. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.737(1) (1972). To avoid double payments the Florida law
provides for subrogation of no-fault insurers to no-fault beneficiaries' liability recoveries.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.736(3) (1972). This system is criticized in note, Insurer's Rights of Re-
imbursement Under Florida's No-Fault Law, 26 FLA. L. Rxv. 534 (1974).
40 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-3113 (Supp. 1975) provides that reimbursement shall be made
to the extent of the recovery after reasonable attorney's fees and other expenses are
deducted to prevent duplication of benefits. The Kansas law survived constitutional at-
tack in Manzanares v. Bell, 214 Kan. 589, 522 P.2d 1291 (1974).
4 1 UTAH STAT. ANN. § 31-41-9 (1973) provides thresholds for general damages and
UTAu STAT. ANN. § 31-41-11 (1973) provides for subrogation.
42 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6A-8 (1973).
43 Id.
44 Rugamer v. Thompson, 130 N.J. Super. 181, 325 A.2d 860 (1974), held that no
exemption pertains in a case of a fracture even though medical expenses were less than
$200. Fennell v. Ferreira, 133 N.J. Super. 63, 335 A.2d 84 (1975), held that thresholds are
an affirmative defense.
45 2A P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 9, § 2058(2) (Cum. Supp. 1974).
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tions on his tort rights and liabilities"'4 by filing an appropriate state-
ment with the Department of Insurance in advance of having suffered
an injury. Apart from this anomaly, the Kentucky law follows a typical
partial tort exemption pattern.
In the absence of a great amount of data that is not now available
or a long run of experience that has not yet been attained, it is exceed-
ingly difficult to evaluate every state's program within its own context
of purposes and goals. Nevertheless, the following subsection attempts
to summarize the results of evaluations made in Florida, Delaware,
and Massachusetts.
In Practice
The Council on Law-Related Studies of Cambridge, Massachusetts
has sponsored empirical studies of no-fault operations in MassachusettsY1
Florida,4 and Delaware.4 ' The Delaware findings can be succinctly put.
First, no lessening of litigation and no diminution of the numbers of
persons seeking pain and suffering recoveries were found to result from
implementation of the Delaware add-on law. Moreover, the findings sug-
gested that Delaware did not have a substantial number of nuisance
value claims either before or after the new law was passed. Adverse
impact on the law profession has been modest but is especially noticeable
in connection with smaller cases. Costs were not examined in detail, but
some reductions were made, perhaps because prices were formerly too
high or because compulsory insurance spread the burden over more
people. A strong affirmative result in making reparations available to
more people was achieved due to universal coverage under Delaware's
relatively generous no-fault benefit provisions. Information about these
points is contained in Table VI.
In concluding his report the Delaware investigator made remarks
that are important in two respects. First, they point up the necessity
of being aware of the condition of the existing reparations system in a
state in formulating a no-fault plan, and second, they offer a judgment
about the efficacy of an add-on law in other states.
40Ky. REV. STAT. § 304.39-060(4) (1975). Rejection of the tort exemption denies the
rejecting person the right to collect no-fault benefits. Ky. REV. STAT. § 30439-060(8)
(1975).47 Widiss, Massachusetts No-Fault Automobile Insurance: Its Impact on the Legal
Profession, BosTow U.L. REy. 323 (1976); Widiss, Accident Victims Under No-Fault
Automobile Insurance: A Massachusetts Survey, 61 IowA L. REV. 1 (1975).4 BLittle, No-Fault Auto Reparation in Florida: An Empirical Examination of Some
of its Effects, 9 J. op LAw REaonm 1 (1976).
4 9Clark & Waterson, 'No-Fault' in Delaware, 6 RUTmEks-CAioE L.J. 225 (1973).
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On the basis of the Delaware experience, one final point can be
made about the question of the effects of an "add-on" as opposed
to a partial tort exemption law. In a small, non-claims-conscious state
the law has at most caused some reduction in the number of relatively
trivial claims being made. Delaware did not have a mass of small
claims in the courts before the new law was in effect, and it still does
not. Whether the legislation would provide the necessary psycho-
logical incentives to discourage nuisance claims in a large claims-
conscious jurisdiction is unproved. We strongly suspect that it would
not, but the matter could only be settled on the basis of experience
in sudh a state.50
Florida is a different state, has a different law, and has experienced
somewhat different results. The following is an excerpt from the preface
and summary of the Florida report of the Council on Law-Related
Studies.
The Florida no-fault system utilizes a tort threshold that was
intended to keep relatively minor personal injury cases out of the
courts. Data from Alachua and Dade Counties from years 1972 and
1973 suggest that the Florida system can reduce the frequency of
personal injury litigation measurably. [Later portions of the report
suggest a reduction of 15 to 20 percent.] Nevertheless, insurance
companies complain that the law is being abused by artifices to de-
feat thresholds, particularly in Dade County, with a resulting increase
in the number of suits being filed. No data are available in this study
nor are there any known to the author that quantify this phenomenon.
The Florida no-fault law mandated that both first and third
party personal injury insurance and third party property damage
insurance be carried by covered motorists.... Experience under no-
fault showed a very substantial shift from third party to first party
claims for . . . personal injury . . . coverages. This is important be-
cause of differences in costs of the two claims modes. It appears clear
that first party personal injury claims are paid with less puffirg owing
to nuisance value and that they also cost less to process. Therefore,
a third party to first party shift implies cost savings.
The data suggest that the amount of time elapsing between dates
of crashes and settlement dates of personal injury insurance claims
was not noticeably affected by no-fault. Furthermore, as to those claims
that wound up in court, no important diminution occurred in the
amount of time elapsing between dates suits were filed and dates of
settlement. Nevertheless, one may not properly infer that no benefit in
speedier claims processing inured to personal injury victims. In fact
a marked diminution in the amount of time elapsing between crash
dates and dates of receipt of first payments did occur, indicating that
5o1d. at 257.
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victims are more likely to receive some recovery earlier, when their
needs may be greatest.
Personal injury insurance claims data show that more claims, are
settled in amounts much closer in value to verified medical losses than
in the superseded system. This suggests that the nuisance value of
relatively minor claims has been reduced, which arguably creates a
more equitable settlement process so far as these claims are concerned.
Whether severely injured victims are more adequately compensated
under the no-fault system cannot be told from the data available
in this study.
Data obtained in this study suggest that three things, happened
in connection with personal injury insurance rates and benefits in
the sample populations in the first two years of no-fault; first, that
the amount of premiums paid per registered vehicle diminished;
second, that the amount of benefits paid per registered vehicle in-
creased; and third, the ratio of benefits, to premiums increased. One
may infer from these results that coverage for personal injury benefits.
expanded and the costs of processing claims were reduced.
In summary, the results of this study suggest that no-fault systems
such as Florida Reparations Reform Act can produce changes in how
reparations are made to injured victims of motor vehicle crashes and
in how much they cost.... Whether or not the changes detected in
[this study] are beneficial is, of course, for the political processes
to determine. Whether or not one would want to rely on the results
of this single study to predict that similar results would occur [else-
where] is a matter for the judgment of the decision makers. 5 '
The CLRS Florida report detected a measurable reduction in the
number of personal injury claims involving the employment of lawyers
and in the number resulting in litigation. A previously unreported sur-
vey 5 2 of a relatively small sample of personal injury lawyers found that
72 percent of those responding saw a diminution in their client popula-
tions in the first year of no-fault with one-third reporting a great de-
crease."3 Nevertheless, about one-quarter reported no change and a few
SlLittle, No-Fault Auto Reparation in Florida: An Empirical Ezamination of Some
of its Effects, 9 J. ox LAw Rrrorm 1 (1976).
52Thi information is extracted from Little & Monchick, Some Observations on the
Impact of Florida's 'No-Fault' Automobile Insurance Law on the Practicing Bar (un-
published).
5 Perhaps expressing the essence of the views of lawyers hurt by no-fault was this
lamentation from one Florida practitioner:
While other professions, particularly the accounting profession, have expanded
the scope of their business and services, the practice of law has been narrowing.
Ever since I have been in the profession, I have seen lawyers lose their tax
work to accountants, their estate work to title companies, their criminal work to
public defenders, and now a great part of their tort practice to insurance corn-
19,76]
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attorneys saw an increase in the numbers of their clients. As the fifth
year of no-fault begins in Florida, it is fair to say that-there has been
no great hue and cry raised against it by lawyers. Many lawyers do not
engage in personal injury Work and are not directly affected. Moreover,
most of those surveyed who are affected indicated that they were ex-
panding their practices into other fields. Finally, Florida's boom growth
probably camouflaged a reduction in the percentage of injuries that
wound up in a lawyer's office under an increase in absolute numbers.
Further observations about the cost of insurance in Florida should
be made. The no-fault law mandated a 15 percent cut 4 in bodily injury
liability costs, and the costs of complete automobile insurance packages,
including no-fault benefits and property damage, declined by 12 to 15
percent between 1971 and 1973."5 In 1974, however, costs of the total
package increased and in 1975 costs were 5 to 10 percent higher than
1971 values56 in some parts of the state. In evaluating these trends one
needs to be aware of the fact that the costs of medical services and auto-
mobile repairs escalated very rapidly during this period.
No-fault has had its greatest impact in Massachusetts. For reasons
yet unknown the first year of no-fault in Massachusetts saw a 40 per-
cent decrease in the number of reported claims as compared to a pre-
dicted 30 percent increase.57 This was accompanied by a drop from $825
in 1970 to $660 in 1971 in the average cost of claims, and resulted in a
windfall to Massachusetts' insurers despite a mandated reduction in
premiums paid for bodily liability insurance.5" The number of automobile
personal injury lawsuits filed witnessed substantial declines early in the
life of the no-fault law and the amount of litigation seems headed toward
a stable reduction of about 50 percent. 59 Unfortunately, even in early
1976 some Massachusetts' court dockets remained clogged, holding up
a "big back-log of motor vehicle tort cases awaiting trial, many dating
panies. The legal pie is getting smaller and there are more attorneys nibbling
at it.
Id. 5 4 
FIA. STAT. ANN. §627.741(2)(a) (1972).
55 Little, No-Fault Auto Reparation in Florida: An Empirical Examination of Some
of its Effects, 9 J. oF LAW REFopR 1, - (1976).
56These estimates are based upon typical insurance premium figures contained in
the author's files. See also, Brainard, Florida: Land of Rising Costs in No-Fault, 10 TkiAL
31 (1974).5 7 This phenomenon has been reported by several writers including Brainard, The
Impact of No-Fault on the Underwriting Results of Massachusetts Insurers, 44 Miss L.J.
174, 178 (1973).
58Id. at 174, 181. An initial 15 percent cut in bodily injury liability rates was man-
dated and was followed by a retroactive 27.6 percent refund.
59Widiss & Bovbjerg, No-Fault in Massachusetts: Its Impact on Courts and Lawyers,
59 A.B.A.J. 487, 489 (1973).
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to pre-no-fault days.""so It is reported that present congestion stems
mainly from criminal cases. 6 While this has had an important economic
effect on the legal profession in Massachusetts, most of the affected
practitioners have been able to accommodate themselves to the new sys-
tem. One observer of the Massachusetts experience has commented:
Over 80 percent of the respondents in the general survey of the bar
indicated that no-fault had not caused them to change or consider
changing their professional lives as a result of no-fault. Of the remain-
ing 17 percent, about a third of the group stated that they had already
either entered into a new professional association or discontinued pri-
vate practice. From an economic standpoint, many of these changes
appear to have been advantageous.62
As indicated, costs of bodily injury liability insurance immediately
dropped in Massachusetts, but no data are available to this writer to
evaluate whether or not the advancing costs of medical and repair serv-
ices has reversed the trend.
Only the Massachusetts study attempted to measure the effects
of no-fault as perceived by traffic crash victims. This was done by sur-
veying random samples of persons listed in official crash reports as
having been injured in no-fault crashes. Four major points were probed:
First, whether potential no-fault claimants were not making claims;
second, the reasons that non-claimants do not make claims; third, the
role of collateral sources in shaping no-fault claims decisions; and
fourth, claimants' level of satisfaction with the system.63
It was found that many officially injured persons never made no-
fault claims. Often they simply did not consider themselves as having
been actually injured." This attests to the imprecise nature of on-the-
scene impressions garnered by police officers and perhaps also to their
conservatism in erring on the inclusive side. About one-fifth of the
non-claimants was injured but suffered little or no medical expense,
little wage loss and made no claim. 5 About one-quarter appeared to
have been "uninformed or misinformed" about the benefits of the
60 Letter from Professor David F. Cavers to the author, March 2, 1976. Professor
Cavers is the president of the Council on Law-Related Studies and this information is
derived from a manuscript be is preparing on the Massachusetts' courts for publication
in the New England Law Review.
61 Id.
62 Widiss, Massachusetts No-Fault Automobile Insurance: Its Impact on the Legal
Profession, 56 BosroN U. L. Ray. 323 (1976).
63Widiss, Accident Victims Under No-Fault Automobile Insurance: A Massachusetts
Profession, 56 BosToN U.L. Rav. 323 (1976).
641d. at 57.
651d.
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no-fault law. 66 While the investigator believes that the losses suffered
by people in this group were small and unimportant to them, still some
people apparently did forfeit extensive benefits through ignorance of the
law. The Massachusetts' investigator believes that this could be avoided
with adequate consumer education. Finally, about 20 percent of the
non-claimants did not make no-fault claims because losses had been
"wholly or substantially covered by other sources.
Two very important inferences from these findings were drawn by
the investigators. One was that: "The statements and actions of these
non-claimants appear to justify the generalization that a significant
number of non-claimants fall into this category precisely because they
do not wish to abuse the system." ' This suggests that overcompensa-
tion through collateral sources is not a universal practice. A second
important inference was that having to make a claim against one's own
insurance carrier does not dissuade victims from filing claims. Certain
no-fault critics had propounded this in explanation of the shortfall in
expected numbers of claims in the first no-fault years in Massachusetts, 69
but the Massachusetts findings, that less than three percent of the non-
claimants saw it as a "dominant" factor and only three or four percent
more assigned it "some importance" 70 in their decisions not to file
claims, appear to have demolished it as a plausible exploration.
The Massachusetts survey showed that no-fault frequently leaves
some losses uncompensated.7 Many claimants were able to augment
their recoveries from collateral sources, but a "clear majority" who ob-
tained benefits from two or more sources sought multiple recoveries
only because all losses had not been compensated." Furthermore, many
no-fault claimants, whom no-fault did fully compensate, did not seek
recovery from collateral sources.7" This finding plus the finding that
many non-claimants had ignored no-fault benefits because full recovery
had been obtained elsewhere led the Massachusetts' investigator to con-
clude "that most automobile accident victims in Massachusetts are not
abusing the compensation system by attempting to secure the maximum
recovery possible from other sources. 4
.6d at 59.
67Id. at 60.
6 81d.
6OSpangenberg, No-Faulk Fact, Fiction and Fallacy, 44 Miss. L.R. 15, 63 (1973).7
oWidiss, supra note 63, at 61.
71Id. at 61.
7 21d. at 63.
73ld.
741d. at 60.
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Notwithstanding the undercompensation reported above, the Massa-
chusetts survey found claimants to be highly satisfied with no-fault Of
those who had received benefits, between 75 and 85 percent were either
"fairly satisfied" or "well satisfied" with procedures. and amounts re-
ceived.75 Of complaints made, the most important were that claimants
often were left too long uninformed about the statuses of their claims
and that the process took too long.76 It was evident that some lawyers
failed to inform claimants of benefits obtained from no-fault carriers.
For example, some victims were simply unaware that they had re-
ceived no benefits, when in fact their lawyers had applied for the bene-
fits and applied them to the payment of medical bills.7 In short, it
appears, that some lawyers have not communicated the values of no-
fault to their tort clients.
A SYSTEMATIC APPROACH TO DEVISING AND EVALUATING No-FAULT
GOALS AND NON-GOALS
It should be apparent to the reader that the typical no-fault reform
plan is comprised of two basic elements. The first is an assured package
of no-faidt benefits payable to all victims without regard to fault. Here-
after this package will be referred to as basic benefits, and will be
assumed to provide specified medical, rehabilitative, and income benefits.
Satisfactory basic benefits subsume several reparation goals, including
a general reparation goal and the goal of receiving payments without
undue delay.
The second part of most reform plans is the tort exemption element
The tort exemption also subsumes several goals including cost reduction,
elimination of nuisance value, lessening court congestion, reallocation of
societal resources, and lessening of corruption within the system. The
myriad of subvariables within these two elements has already been
exposed as have the numerous combinations of subvariables which have
been employed. One purpose of this portion of the paper is to attempt
to tie the elemental considerations into a simplified system that may be
used both for designing new no-fault plans and evaluating present ones.
One point that quickly emerges is that more detailed data are needed
than are likely to be available to make a decision on the basis of formula
alone. Very large areas of judgment seem sure to remain.
So far as reparation goals are concerned, the no-fault basic benefit
principle provides a vehicle for eliminating uncompensated and under-
T~5 d. at 64.
78Id.
7I7d. at 64-65.
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compensated victims and also for eliminating payment delays. Ancillary
measures are needed to prevent overpayment of some victims. These
measures relate to various cost savings and reallocation goals. Conse-
quently, the rational way to look at the whole system is to tie the various
components together in a cost model. Fortunately, the near universalityW 8
of insurance makes it feasible to relate costs to the components of a
reparation system, as follows:
Insurance Costs = First Party Insurance Costs + Liability
Insurance Costs + Workmen's Compensation
Costs + Health Insurance Costs + Other
Insurance Costs
Each of these insurance elements may be divided into the costs
components described earlier-benefits reaching the victim, victims' legal
fees, insurance companies' settlement costs, commissions paid insurance
agents, other underwriting costs, and profit. Benefits reaching victims
can be further suballocated to medical related expenses, wage and earn-
ings losses, and pain and suffering damages. Bearing in mind that all
these elements do not pertain equally to each form of insurance, one may
produce a simplified, comprehensive model as follows:
Insurance Costs of Automobile Crash Injuries = Medical Expenses
+ Wage Losses + Pain & Suffering Damages + Claimants'
Lawyers Fees + Insurance Co. Settlement Expenses + Insurance
Commissions + Other Underwriting Expenses + Profits + Col-
lateral Sources
In this equation the term "collateral sources" designates the aggregation
of all the costs of collateral insurance sources.
One may now produce a matrix to show what effect various no-
fault reform measures would have on each of these cost elements. A
"plus" or "minus" value may be assigned to each measure depending
upon whether it would impose additional costs or allow savings when
applied to the components set forth in Table VII.
Basic benefits, while meeting reparation goals, also increase costs
of several elements, including the purely administrative aspects of the
insurance system. If one were to choose unlimited benefits, these costs
would increase even more.7 This is one aspect of no-fault reform that
7 8 Insurance does not cover all costs of motor vehicle crash injuries because of
uninsured and underinsured situations. Nevertheless, the insurance system is so extensive
that the uninsured situations probably do not disturb the validity of inferences that may
be drawn from the following analysis.
79 One no-fault critic uses U.S. Department of Transportation data to make the
estimation that:
The automobile drivers who now buy standard limit policies would have to pay a
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is not likely to receive advance attention and may be a source of disap-
pointment when insurance costs do not fall to the degree anticipated.
The tort exemptions promise savings across the board. Reducing
nuisance value pain and suffering damages is the prime goal, but medi-
cal expenses and wage losses presumably also decline because it is no
longer profitable to inflate these elements in hope of magnifying the
pain and suffering recovery. By the same token claimants' legal fees are
diminished and, because less money is needed in the system, the various
insurance-related administrative costs also decline.
To what extent one would eliminate pain and suffering damages is
a matter of judgment. The states that set a medical expense threshold
as great as $1,000 probably exempt a very great majority of all injuries.
This fact tempts one to propose a complete pain and suffering exemption
that would eliminate totally the liability insurance system and its atten-
dant costs. Such a goal, even if otherwise desirable, does not appear
feasible because, until no-fault becomes universal, motorists will need
to purchase liability insurance to secure residual risks. Also, many rea-
sonable people would insist upon some alternative means of making rep-
aration for non-economic detriment suffered by severely maimed people,
and others would strongly object to complete abrogation on philosophic
grounds. Since complete abrogation seems an unlikely development in
the forseeable future, no further consideration will be given it here.
Elimination of overlapping recoveries from collateral sources clearly
reduces their costs. This assumes that basic benefits are primary. If col-
lateral sources were made primary, various motor vehicle cost elements
would be reduced instead. While eliminating the collateral source rule
would be counterproductive to some reparations goals in some instances,
it must be scored with minuses as a cost saver.
Several states allow basic benefits insurance carriers to seek re-
imbursement from tortfeasors' liability insurance carriers even though
a threshold is not exceeded."' In other states when the pain and suffering
threshold is exceeded the tortfeasor is allowed to recover all provable
damages, including those for which basic benefits were paid."1 In those
states the basic benefits carrier is provided rights of subrogation to some
41 percent increase just to compensate the 1 percent of the whole number, of
victims, even if it were assumed that no payment whatever would be made
for the economic loss of the remaining 99 percent.
Spangenberg, No-Fault Fact, Fiction, and Fallacy, 44 Mss. L.J. 15, 52 (1973). The one
percent Spangenberg refers to comprises the most severely injured victims.
80 See, e.g., GA. CODE AN. § 56-3407b (Cum. Supp. 1975); Ky. REv. STAT. § 304.39-
020(5)(b) (1974) and §304.39-030(1) (1974); and PA. STAT. ANx. tit. 40, § 1009.201
(Cum. Supp. 1975).
SIKansas and Florida. See notes 37-40 supra.
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or all of the recovery. These measures presumably serve several goals:
to put more money in the hands of victims; to retain fault as an element
in allocating costs between no-fault and liability carriers; and to attain
these goals without allowing double recoveries. In fact, these measures
also add costs to the system that could be avoided by precluding recovery
of basic benefits from tortfeasors. Alternatively, one could allow for re-
covery against tortfeasors and provide complete reimbursement to the
basic benefits carrier, probably providing lower savings. For classifica-
tion purposes, the elimination of reimbursement receives minuses.
The compulsory aspect of no-fault reform causes more insurance
contracts to be written and thereby increases administrative costs. Never-
theless, the overall effect should be to reduce the unit cost of insurance
by virtue of the fact that a total pool of -expenses is spread over more
buyers. Hence, compulsory insurance receives minuses on Table VII.
Bulk insurance marketing plans and state insurance plans would
cut tort law-liability insurance system costs that have remained un-
touched so far. Such measures would Teceive minuses and pluses be-
cause they could cut costs of already insured individuals but would in-
crease certain overall costs.
The final item, effect of corruption of thresholds, reflects a pheno-
menon that may be occurring in reaction to Florida's exemption to pain
and suffering damages. Because accruing $1,000 in medical expenses
removes that exemption, the potential of abuse exists by utilizing medi-
cal resources for the sole purpose of exceeding the threshold. If lawyers,
doctors, and claimants create an environment that causes or tolerates
employment of unneeded medical procedures and costs for the purpose
of surpassing the threshold, then every cost element of motor vehicle
insurance will advance. Worse than that, a new source of corruption is
created.
While a legitimate economic decision could not be made on the
basis of a predomination of minuses (savings) over pluses (added
costs), the minus-plus display in Table VII argues for taking a close
look at no-fault with more complete data. One must place a value (that
may in part be non-economic in nature) on his goals, of course, but if
one finds that several reparation goals can be met while at the same time
making savings, then reform may become well nigh irresistible. On the
other hand, even salutory goals may be thwarted if the economic costs
are too high.
The plan of Table VII may now be used to evaluate the law of
Florida as an illustration. Florida provides basic benefits up to a limit
[Vol. 51 :635
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of $5,000.11 While that limit has mot been shown to be grossly inadequate
it is doubtless true that certain reparation goals would be better served
by higher limits, say $10,000 as in Delaware,8 3 or $25,000 as in Colo-
rado," or $50,000 as in New York.85 Caution should be taken to prevent
the availability of "free" benefits from becoming a disincentive to speedy
and -complete recuperation of victims. Accordingly, it would be wise to
leave some of the non-medical losses upon the victim, as is typically done
in wage loss recoveries.8" Furthermore, to avoid overlapping recoveries,
whatever additions are made -to basic benefits should be paralleled by an
increase in an exemption to tort liability for damages covered by basic
benefits.
The coverage of Florida's no-fault law also could be expanded to
heighten the attainment of reparation goals. Presently commercial vehi-
cles and motorcycles are excluded. Also, the Florida law contains no
program for compensating victims of financially irresponsible motorists
who have failed to purchase required insurance, and it does not protect
the economic interests of the survivors of fatally injured victims. The
first point is addressed in the laws of a few states by creating state funds
financed by insurers87 to compensate non-insured victims and the latter
point is covered in a few states by inclusion of survivor benefits in basic
benefits.8" These measures would, of course, add costs to the system.
Florida's pain and suffering thresholds are typical: either $1,000
in medical expenses, or the occurrence of specified classes of physical
injuries or death. 9 Presently, there are no data or cases available to
evaluate the efficiency of physical injury classification thresholds, and it
is difficult to evaluate whether or not the $1,000 medical threshold figure
should be altered. My own inclination would be to increase the threshold
so as to further reduce costs. This view can be countered on the grounds
that a legitimate element of recovery is being denied and that an in-
herently corruptable system will simply be corrupted to greater extent.
This threat leads to the conclusion that whatever else is done, some
82 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.736(1) (i972).
SsDEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 2118(a)(2) (Rev. 1974).
8 4 CoLo. RnV. STAT. § 10-4-706(b) (1974).
85N.y. INs. LAw § 671(a) (McKinney 1975).
8 GMost states that provide work loss benefits either limit the percentage of loss that
may he recovered or impose an overall limit See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.736(1) (a)
(1972); CoLO. Rnv. STAT. ANN. i 10-4-706(d) (1974); CONN. Gm. STAT. ANN. § 38-320(e)
(Supp. 1976) ; HAwAn RaV. STAT. § 294-2(10)(C) (Supp. 1975) ; M ml. STAT. ANN. § 65B.44
(3) (Supp. 1976): N.Y. INs. LAw § 671(1) (b) (McKinney Supp. 1975).
87 See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-3116 (Supp. 1975).
8 8 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 56-3407b (Cum. Supp. 1975); Ky. REv. STAT. § 304.39-
020(1)(d) (1974) and §304.39-030(1) (1974); REA. STAT. ANN. §627.737(2) (1972).89 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1009.201 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
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measure should be taken to avoid abuse of the medical expense thres-
hod. The Pennsyvania law contains a feature that may be helpful. From
costs that may be aggregated to reach the threshold, the law excludes
expenses of X-rays and rehabilitation expenses exceeding $100. Pre-
sumably this reflects a belief that it is these kinds of services that are
most easily misused. If it is feasible to segregate services that are most
prone to abuse, then such a provision should be added to Florida's law.
When the pain and suffering thresholds are exceeded, a plaintiff
may recover fully from the tortfeasor but must then make reimburse-
ment to the basic benefits carrier. This plan is unwieldy and costly and
should be supplanted by a plan which does not allow tort recovery for
basic benefits in any situation.
Whether or not bulk insurance marketing plans could be effectively
employed in Florida, I cannot say. For that reason no further comment
on this subject will be made. On the other hand, it seems certain that
the State of Florida could preempt the motor vehicle insurance business
as a governmental function,9 probably at substantial overall savings.
Although it seems certain that no such change in Florida is likely to
come to pass or even to be seriously considered, the pros and cons may
nevertheless be examined.
On the pro side is the substantial savings in marketing and under-
writing costs that might be forthcoming by integrating the marketing
of insurance into the state's licensing systems. While I have no data to
quantify the possible extent of savings in Florida, a careful study in
Hawaii projected savings of about 14 percent.2
The opposing arguments are more numerous. For one, a great
number of people are likely to be put out of work. Some of these would
find employment in the state's insurance system, but probably not all.
Moreover, the investment side of the insurance industry would be
grossly affected. 8 Although a state plan would require accumulation and
investment of reserve funds, the nature of the investments might change
drastically. What effect this would have upon the economy that relies
upon this investment resource is beyond the scope of this paper, but it
could be great.
90PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1009.301(5)(B) (Cum. Supp. 1975).
9 1 This statement ignores examination of constitutional issues that such a preemption
would spawn. These issues, while neither trivial nor unimportant, are beyond the scope
of this paper.9 2 A Study of Hawaii's Motor Vehide Insurance Program, Special Report No. 72-1, A
Report to the Legislature of the State of Hawaii (January 1972).
OsSpangenberg describes and criticizes how the investment side of the insurance in-
dustry operates. See Spangenberg, No-Fault Fact, Fiction, and Fallacy, 44 Miss. L. Rv.
15 (1973).
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The most incendiary opposing argument would be ideological. Op-
ponents would see such a move as an unnecessary intrusion by govern-
ment into the free enterprise system. While intrusions by government
are to be avoided at all reasonable costs, an objection to such a position
can be made in this instance. Ordinarily, free enterprise is touted for
its ability to innovate improvements in products and production and
marketing techniques and thereby accomplish goals at less cost than a
monopoly. With compulsory insurance, however, not much room is left
in product design and production techniques. Therefore a strong argu-
ment can be made that competing on the basis of marketing techniques
alone offers little hope for cost savings, especially when compared to a
state monopoly that already has direct contact with all potential buyers.
In short, if government has defined and mandated an insurance system,
little room may remain for benefits to accrue from free enterprise. The
appropriate answer to this may simply be that government bureaucracies
are inherently wasteful and suspect and that the value of potential cost
savings is not worth the risk. Certainly, it does not appear timely for
the introduction of such a plan in Florida.
In summation I would repeat the cautionary remark made earlier
-reform measures are best devised in terms of perceived need. If a
state's existing tort law-liability insurance system is not subject to all
the criticisms outlined earlier, then less extreme measures are justified.
This may account for the add-on laws. Perhaps the only critical goal in
add-on states was to make benefits available to more people. In Dela-
ware, for example, nuisance value recoveries and court congestion ap-
parently were not major problems; hence, tort exemptions may not have
been as effective as they were in Massachusetts and Florida. The princi-
pal lesson of the current no-fault experience may be that plans ought to
include elements that would meet local needs. This view, of course, runs
in direct opposition to those who advocate national no-fault plans.
No-FAULT: AN EVALUATION
Has no-fault proved to be a good movement or has it not? My
own assessment is that no-fault is a much ballyhooed concept of modest
attainments. Without doubt the most beneficial result is that almost
everybody is entitled to prompt treatment of injuries without regard
to fault and without delay. The extent of this benefit varies markedly as
has been seen. Massachusetts has shown that court congestion can be
eased, and Florida has shown that nuisance value can be deflated.
Nevertheless, the biggest disappointment to the public may have been
that costs of insurance have not declined to the extent anticipated.
1976]
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Frequently, the added costs of no-fault benefits simply were not ade-
quately calculated. In addition, inflation has tended to offset gains.
Finally, most states simply have not employed all of the cost saving
methods available to them. When they do, better results in cost savings
may been seen and, if comparable measures to eliminate unnecessary
insurance costs such as those which have been taken to eliminate un-
necessary legal costs are ever adopted, then very substantial savings
may be anticipated.
Afterword
After this article was prepared, the 1976 Florida legislature ad-
dressed some of the points alluded to above. Its principal goal was
reduction in insurance costs. Measures were adopted to replace the
medical loss tort exemption threshold with a more stringent verbal
threshold; to reduce overlap between no-fault, tort and collateral re-
coveries, and to outlaw fraudulent practices that allegedly had been
employed to subvert the tort exemption. Each of these measures ap-
pears to be reasonably well suited to cutting costs and deserves detailed
study by drafters of no-fault laws.
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